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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-Damages for mental and emotional distress-Mother
who suffered shock and mental illness upon viewing her son's in-
juries resulting from a gunpowder explosion was entitled to
damages in event negligence on part of defendant was proved.
Archibald v. Braverman (Calif. 1969).
The defendant, in violation of state statute,' sold a quantity
of gunpowder to the plaintiff's minor son, who subsequently was
severely injured 2 by an explosion of the gunpowder. Moments
after the explosion, the plaintiff appeared at the scene of the
accident, and in an attempt to aid her son, suffered severe shock,
fright, and mental illness requiring institutionalization. In this
action for the mother's injuries, the trial court granted a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Second Division, for the
State of California, held that the shock suffered by the plaintiff
was fairly contemporaneous with the accident and thus, plaintiff
was entitled to damages for mental and emotional distress, in
the event that defendant's negligence was proved. Archibald v.
Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2d Div.
1969).
Damages for mental and emotional distress caused by a negli-
gent injury to a third person have been a subject of great judi-
cial controversy for many years. The majority rule is best
stated as follows:
[N]o recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional
disturbance, or for a bodily injury or illness resulting
therefrom, in the absence of a contemporaneous bodily
contact or independent cause of action, or an element of
wilfulness, wantonness, or maliciousness, in cases in
which there is no injury other than one to a third per-
son, even though recovery would have been permitted
had the wrong been directed against the plaintiff. The
rule is frequently applied to mental or emotional dis-
turbances caused by another's danger, or sympathy for
another's suffering. It has been regarded as applicable
1. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 12082 (West Supp. 1969).
2. The injuries were: traumatic amputation of the right hand, wrist, and
forearm; traumatic amputation of a portion of the left hand; severe lacerations
of the body; injury to the right eye; and loss of copious amounts of blood.
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to mental or emotional disturbance resulting from an
injury not only to a stranger, but also to a relative of
the plaintiff, such as a child, sister, father, or spouse.3
The reasons most courts will not entertain these actions are
expressed in the leading case of Waube v. Warrington,4 which
involved a mother who watched her infant child being run over
by a negligent defendant. In Waube, the court analogized the
plaintiff's position to that of Mrs. Palsgraf, and held, that
since no duty was owed, there was no negligence as to the plain-
tiff. Concern for an expansion of liability greatly overshadow-
ing the defendant's culpability and the difficulty of effective
administration of justice in these cases also led the court to deny
recovery for Mrs. Waube's injuries.6
In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Oo.7 the California
Supreme Court originally adopted the Waube rationale. In
Amaya another mother observed her infant child being run over
by a negligent defendant. The court, in accord with the general
rule8 held that the defendant would not be liable for the mother's
injuries because no duty was owned to her.9
Six years later in Dillon v. Legg,'0 the California Supreme
Court overruled its decision in Amayal- and allowed a mother
who witnessed her daughter's death in an automobile accident
3. 52 An. JuR. Torts § 70 (1944).
4. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935) ; see 18 A.L.R. 2d 220 (1951).
5. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.99 (1928).
PaIsgraf, the firecrackers-falling scales case, stands for the proposition that
there is no negligence towards the plaintiff unless there is a duty of due care
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Since Mrs. Palsgraf was an unforesee-
able plaintiff there was no duty of due care owed to her.
6. Other courts have expressed concern with the problems of distinguishing
between valid and false claims, the supposed lack of competent medical evi-
dence, and the probability of being inundated with lawsuits if recovery is allowed
to this class of plaintiffs.
7. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
8. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P2d 513,
518, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38 (1963).
9. Id. at 520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40-42. The Ainaya court, in part, relied
on Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d. 43, 319 P2d 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
1957), which held that a plaintiff must fear for her own safety and could not
recover for fear of an act which endangered her husband alone. Ainaya also
dealt at length with administrative and policy reasons in support of denying
recovery-primarily the fear of overextension of defendant's liability and the
increased possibility of whimsical and fraudulent claims.
10. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
11. There is an interesting sidelight to such a rapid reversal of Amaya. The
trial court in Anmaya ruled that the mother could not collect, and she appealed
to the district court of appeal. There Justice Tobriner, in a decision slightly
ahead of its time, held that Mrs. Amaya could collect for her mental and
emotional distress. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1962). The defendant appealed to the
California Supreme Court.
During the interval betveen the district court of appeal decision in Amaya
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to collect for the fright and shock she suffered. To establish a
duty to the mother, the court adopted a policy proposed by Pros-
ser: "it has properly been said that when a child is endangered,
it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be somewhere
in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock."' 2 Asserting the
position that duty is only the sum total of those policy con-
siderations on which the defendant's liability is predicated, the
court allowed Mrs. Dillon to recover.'3 Dillon substituted for an
inflexible rule denying all recovery, the policy of determining
case-by-case the merits of each particular action.
To aid the court in its case-by-case determination and to place
some limit on the defendant's liability, Dillon adopted three
factors14 to be considered in cases where the plaintiff suffered
an emotional shock which resulted in a physical injury. These
factors are to be used in determining the foreseeability of injury
to the plaintiff, or if a duty of due care is owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff. The factors are as follows:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of
the accident as contrasted with one who was a dis-
tance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and con-
temporaneous observance of the accident, as cont-
trasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence.
and the supreme court review of the case, Justice Tobriner was appointed to
the California Supreme Court. The supreme court, Tobriner not participating,
in a 4-3 decision, overruled the district court of appeal decision in Ainaya and
held that Mrs. Amaya could not collect for emotional and mental distress.
The judge who acted in place of Justice Tobriner voted with the majority.
Six years later, when essentially the same factual circumstances arose in
Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision overruled the
Ainaya decision. The opinion, written by Justice Tobriner, bears a remarkable
resemblance to the district court of appeal decision in Anaya.
12. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (3d ed. 1964), at
353.
13. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 923, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 83
(1968). The court disposed of the contentions involving administrative difficul-
ties of a rule that would allow recovery by quoting from Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros., [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681.
I should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such claims
on grounds of policy alone, and in order to prevent the possible
success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course in-
volves the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily
implies a certain degree of distrust, which I do not share, in the
capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claim.
14. Prosser suggests two other limiting factors. That the injury inflicted
on the third person must be a serious one, and that the plaintiff's shock must
result in physical harm. W. PaossER, supra note 12, at 354.
19701
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(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely re-
lated, as contrasted with an absence of any relation-
ship or the presence of only a distant relationship.1
(emphasis added)
The court in Arcibald v. Braverman '8 was called upon for
the first time to make a judicial determination of the factors set
forth in Dillon. The court easily disposed of the "nearness" and
"realtionship" factors, since the victim was Mrs. Archibald's son,
and she appeared on the scene of the accident within moments
of its occurrence. 7
Thus, the primary basis of contention in ATrclibald centered
on whether or not the plaintiff must actually observe the acci-
dent. The court viewed the contemporaneous observance factor
as not necessarily requiring the plaintiff to be present at the time
of the accident, but only as requiring that the plaintiff's shock
be fairly contemporaneous with the accident itself.'8 Taking
notice of the fact that viewing her son's grievous injuries could
be as traumatic to the mother as witnessing the accident itself,
the court decided that since the shock to the mother resulted from
observance of her son's injuries a short time after the accident
that she was in the class to be protected.
The extension of protection for mental and emotional distress
to plaintiffs who only observed the injuries of the victim and
not the accident itself is the real significance of Archibald. As
the distance of the plaintiff from the scene of the accident grows
longer, as the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim
becomes more remote, as the time between the accident and the
plaintiff's observance of the injuries increases, the outer limits
to be placed on the defendant's liability will necessitate the
California courts' drawing fine lines of distinction based upon
more subtle facts than those in the present case.' 9
RAYmoND DAVID MASSEY
15. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal Rptr. 72,
80 (1968).
16. 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Dist. Ct App. 4th Dist. 2d Div. 1969).
17. The record did not disclose where Mrs. Archibald was at the time of the
accident or how long it took her to arrive at the scene, but only that she
appeared within "moments" of its occurrence.
18. Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (Dist. Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 2d Div. 1969); citing W. PRossER, supra note 12, at 354.
19. The court itself made a similar statement in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr72, 81 (1968).
[Vol. 22
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Apportionment- Statutory provi-
sion allowing each land owner to cast one vote for each $100
assessed value of real property within an irrigation district is
not a denial of equal protection. Schindler v. Palo Verde Irriga-
tion District (Ct. App. Cal. 1969).
Schindler, a small property owner, brought a class action in
which he challenged a statutory provision which allowed each
owner of real property to cast one vote for each one hundred
dollars assessed value of real property owned in the irrigation
district, alleging that the voting scheme deprived him and other
small land owners of equal protection of the law. The California
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Division held that such an
apportionment of voting power did not deny the plaintiff and
other members of his class equal protection of the law because
the voting procedure was necessary to further a compelling state
interest, and because the statute was drawn with such precision
that no one affected by the election was denied a fair voice in the
electoral process. Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Distriot,
82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Ct. App. Cal. 1969).
The importance of Schindler lies in the fact that while it is not
technically a "one man, one vote" case, the Califorina court
thought it necessary to use the test devised for "one man, one
vote" cases by the Supreme Court of the United States, begin-
ning in Reynolds v. Sims,' and Avery v. Midland County,2 and
further refined in Kramer v. Union Free School District 1 and
Cirpriano v. City of Houma.4 The California courts, in apply-
ing this doctrine, had in the past upheld its applicability to the
election of county boards of supervisors5 as well as to water dis-
tricts.8 These cases turned on the idea that voter influence
should not be diluted by improper districting. What the plain-
1. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
3. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). In Kramer the Court fashioned a two-pronged
test, considering first whether the classification was necessary to further a
compelling state interest and second whether the statute was drawn so that
no one with a direct interest in the activity is effectively disenfranchised.
4. 395 U.S. 701. (1969) This case dealt with a Louisiana statute which al-
lowed only those persons owning real property to vote in an election concerning
the issuance of revenue bonds to finance improvements in the municipal water
system. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court said that the impact of
the bond issue upon the property owners was unconnected to their status as
real property owners, and that those who owned no property had the same
interest in the bond election as those who did own property.
5. Miller v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara Co., 63 Cal.2d 343, 405
P2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1965).
6. Thompson v. Board of Directors of Turlock Irr. Dist., 247 Cal. App. 2d
587, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct App. 1967).
1970]
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tiff in Schindler contended was that his influence as a voter was
being unjustly diluted by the franchise apportionment scheme
within the district.
The Palo Verde Irrigation District Act,7 passed in 1923, pro-
vided for the establishment of an irrigation district to encompass
the area of Imperial and Riverside counties, the activities of
which were to be governed by a seven-man board of trustees,
elected at large from within the district.8 In the election of this
board, each land owner, real or corporate, was allowed to cast
one vote for each one hundred dollars worth of assessed value
of land and other real property held within the district.9
The plaintiff, Schindler, had initiated a class action seeking
relief from what he claimed was a denial of equal protection.
The complaint as originally filed alleged that the plaintiff had
written to the defendant demanding that land owners be allowed
to cumulate their votes pursuant to section 2235 of the Corpora-
tions Code,10 or in the alternative, that each land owner be
granted one vote regardless of the amount of property held. The
plaintiff later amended his complaint demanding further alterna-
tive relief, namely, that the irrigation district be divided into
seven divisions, according to the provisions of the Irrigation Dis-
trict Law. 1 The defendant district's demurrer was sustained.
The California court, in upholding the trial court's dismissal
of the claim, used, not the traditional test of equal protection,
by which a statute was upheld if there was any rational basis
for the classification used in the distribution of the franchise,
but rather the test utilized in the recent decision of Kramer v.
Union Free SohooZ Distriet.12 In Kramer an adult male, other-
wise qualified to vote, successfully contended that a New York
statute which allowed only the owners of real property or those
whose children attended schools within the district to vote in
elections of school board members denied him equal protection of
the law. The test announced in Kramer was twofold: first, the
classification in the statute must be necessary to further a com-
pelling state interest; and second, the statute must be drawn with
7. CAL. WATER CoDE-AP"., §§ 33-1 to -75 (West 1968).
8. Id. at § 33-5.
9. Id. at § 33-6.
10. CAL CORP. CODE § 2235 (West 1955). The court failed to find any
provision in this section to grant the relief which the plaintiff sought
11. CAL. WATER CODE § 21550 (West 1956). But see CAL. WATER CODE §
20513 (West 1956), in which the Palo Verde Irrigation District is expressly
exempted from the operation of § 21550.
12. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
[Vol. 22
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such precision that no one with a direct interest in the activity
is denied a voice in the election. In dealing with the application
of the test to the facts of the Schindler case, the California
Court first dismissed the claim that Schindler was different
from Kramer in that the latter case dealt with complete disen-
franchisement while the Schindler case dealt only with claimed
dilution of voter influence:
Any disparity in the statutory grant of the franchise,
whether it be in the quantum of influence distributed
among the voters or in the total denial of franchise to
some and its grant to others, must be subjected to close
judicial examination to determine whether the classifi-
cation meets the standards prescribed by Kramer.13
The court also refused to make the distinction employed in
Thompson v. Board of Directors of Turlock Irigation District'4
by stating:
The fact that a service provided by a public corporation
or special district in one which could be provided by a
private agency is not a valid ground of distinction ....
[W]hen the state engages in those activities through a
governmental agency and provides for citizen partici-
pation through the election process, the distribution of
voting rights must meet the equal protection standards
prescribed in Kramer and Cipriano.]15
In applying the first Kramer test, that of a compelling state
interest, the court noted such an interest in the reclamation of
waste lands through flood control, drainage, and irrigation
works.16 Before the passage of the act which established the
district, the farmers in the valley had been repeatedly and
seriously damaged by the flooding of the Colorado River. One
of the most important reasons for the act was to eliminate the
13. 82 Cal. Rptr. at 65. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 562, (1964)
. . . [A]ny alleged infringement of the right to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized."
14. 247 Ca. App. 2d 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App. 1967). This case held
that divisions within an irrigation district need not be re-drawn to comply
with "one man, one vote" requirements unless the board of directors abused
the discretion given them to draw the districts.
15. 82 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
16. People ex rel Chapman v. Sacremento. Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373,
103 P. 207 (1909), " . . . It was clearly desirable and beneficial to the state
that all of these lands should be reclaimed for purposes of husbandry. This
improvement would add great wealth to the state, and this improvement there-
fore would result in a public benefit." Id. at 379, 103 P. at 211.
1970]
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expense and inefficiency caused by the operation of three in-
dependent agencies in the valley.17 The court stated:
The grant of election franchise to land owners, resident
and non-resident, is necessary to "further a compelling
state interest." Absent the voting qualification provided
by the Act, it is doubtful that the District could have
been formed or functioned.' 8
The court felt that, even though the Act authorized the District
to provide domestic water service,19 that purpose was secondary
to the primary legislative intent of insuring that the farming
interests in the valley were protected against flood damage and
had an adequate irrigation system.
In applying the second Kramer test to the facts of the
Sehindler case, the court observed that the provisions of the act
establishing the district provided that the financial burdens of
operating the district were borne only by real property owners
and that residents who did not own real property paid none of
the assessments paid by the landowners. The assessments
20
were placed annually on the real property in relation to the
amount of real property owned in the district,21 and in this
manner, the assessment paid by the land owner would be in
proportion to the land he owned in the district. Thus,
. .. the benefits and burdens accrue to each land owner
in proportion to the extent of land owned, [and] the
grant of franchise in proportion to the assessed value of
land, ownership fairly distributes voting influence
among those primarily and directly interested in direct
proportion to the stake each has in the district.22
17. The Palo Verde Drainage District controlled the drainage activities;
the Palo Verde Joint Levee District provided flood control; and a private
mutual water company provided irrigation facilities.
18. 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
19, CAL. WATER CODE-APP. § 33-10 (West 1968). It is interesting that
the court should note this, since an allegation that the District actually pro-
vided domestic water service would presumably raise the precise issue which the
court explicitly stated was not involved-the constitutionality of the provision
limiting the franchise to property owners, when the District's acts; i.e.,
supplying the homes of the district with domestic service, would directly and
substantially affect all those in the valley, whether or not they owned real
property. Cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
20. CAL. WATER CODE-APP. § 22-27 (West 1968). It should be noted that
an assessment is not a tax in the sense that it raises revenue for general
governmental purposes, since an assessment is levied only on real property
within a limited area for the payment of the costs of local improvements. See
48 A ,. JUR. Special or Local Assessments § 3 (1943).
21. See CAL. WATER CoDE-APP. § 33-28 (West 1968).
22. 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
[Vol. 2
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The court deemed it unnecessary to deal with the validity of
the requirement of owning real property in order to vote, but
the court did use a test which was devised to deal with precisely
that fact situation. It is significant that the Kramer test, which
in effect requires the state to show that its scheme for the dis-
tribution of voter influence is not a denial of equal protection
was applied in a case not strictly analogous to Kramer in that
the Schindler "special district" situation is one of the areas be-
tween those cases in which the Supreme Court applied the "one
man, one vote," doctrine and those cases in which the doctrine
has been held not relevant.
2
8
Mior 1m D. ILxAw
23. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), ("one man, one
vote" not applicable to a county school board appointed by a properly elected
local school board); Sullivan v. Alabama State Bar, 295 F. Supp. 1216 (M.D.
Ala. 1969), aff'd -men., 394 U.S. 812 (1969), ("one man, one vote" not applica-
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CONTRACTS-Limitation of Liability-Where limiting clause
failed to mention "merchantability" specifically, limitation of
liability to purchase price under Uniform Commercial Code §
2-719 held ineffective to limit recovery under an implied war-
ranty of merchantability, Zicari v. Joseph Han-is Co., (App.
Div. N.Y. 1969).
The plaintiffs' purchased cabbage seed from the defendant
seed company and plaintiff Zicari used the seed to plant 70 acres
on his farm. When the crop matured it was discovered that the
entire crop was infested with Blackleg fungus, rendering it
worthless. In his complaint, plaintiff Zicari had alleged that
his original order was for 80 pounds of domestic cabbage seed,
and contained a warranty2 to the effect that the seed would be
labeled on the containers and that the seed would conform to the
label description as required by law. This warranty also made a
general disclaimer of other or further warranties, express or
implied, and limited liability to the purchase price of the seed.
This written order was subsequently modified to 19 pounds of an
Australian seed when the seed company was unable to deliver
domestic seed. le further alleged that the defendant gave an
oral warranty that the Australian seed was free of Blackleg
fungus at the time the order was modified.
The plaintiffs brought action to recover alleged damages of
$77,000 for the 1966 cabbage crop and $100,000 for inability to
supply customers with cabbage after the 1966 growing season.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on
plaintiffs' third cause of action, implied warranty of fitness,
and summary judgement for the plaintiff, limited to the
1. Five plaintiffs were represented in this action against Joseph Harris Co.
Three of the plaintiffs obtained their seed from plaintiff Zicari who was acting
as their agent. A fourth plaintiff, Frank Swercznskd, purchased his seed
directly from the defendant as did plaintiff Zicari. All plaintiffs alleged
essentially the same causes of action.
2. The text of the warranty is as follows:
All orders subject to the following conditions: Joseph Harris
Co., Inc., warrants that seed, plants or bulbs sold will be labeled
on the containers and that they will conform to the label descrip-
tions as required under State and Federal Seed Laws. Our liability
on this warranty is limited to the purchase price of the seeds,
plants, or bulbs.
We make no other or further warranty, express or implied,
including any other or further warranty for fitness of purpose.
Our liability for (1) breach of contract, or (2) mistake or omis-
sion in connection with these seeds, plants or bulbs, shall be
similarly limited in amount to the purchase price. No liability
hereunder shall be enforceable unless the buyer or user reports
to the seller within a reasonable period (not to exceed 30 days)
after discovery, any condition that might lead to a complaint.
[Vol. 22
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purchase price of the seed, on the plaintiffs' fourth cause of
action, implied warranty of merchantability. In its holding the
trial court found that while the defendant had failed to effec-
tively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability, re-
covery under this warranty was limited to the purchase price of
the seed. This appeal was taken from the third and fourth causes
of action only, the first two causes of action, based on negligence
and negligent misrepresentation, not being raised here.
In reversing the trial court's decision on the limitation of
recovery to the purchase price of the seed, the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that in order to limit damages for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, "merchanta-
bility" must be expressly mentioned in the limiting clause.
Zicari v. Joseph Haris Co., 33 App. Div.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1969).
While not indicated in the opinion, the specific interrelation-
ship of sections 2-316 and 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, with regard to the limitation of recovery under implied
warranties of merchantability, appears to be one of first impres-
sion.8  The basic question raised here is whether the implied
warranty of merchantability may be effectively nullified by a
general clause limiting damages to the purchase price of the
product.
Subsection (2) of U.C.C. section 2-3164 requires the specific
mention of the word "merchantability" in any clause excluding
or modifying the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it. Subsection (4) of that section permits the limitation
of remedies for breach of warranty in accordance with sections
2-718 and 2-719 of the Code. Subsection (1) (a) of section 2-719
indicates that one acceptable method of limiting the buyer's
remedy is to limit recovery to the purchase price of the goods.
On its face then, it would seem clear that the Code does require
the mention of "merchantability" in any clause attempting to
limit the buyers recovery under section 2-719. However the
official Comment to section 2-316 states, "Under subsection (4)
the question of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections
referred to [sections 2-718 and 2-719] rather than by this
[section 2-316] section."5 From this comment, one could con-
3. Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968), cited as support for the holding in this
case, dealt with an unlimited express warranty of merchantability.
4. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2) (1962 version).
5. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316, Comment 2.
19,701
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elude that the modification or limitation of remedies for breach
of warranty available under section 2-T19 of the Code is to be
considered independently of section 2-316. One consequence of
such an interpretation could be the effective nullification of the
implied warranty of merchantability which a seller had failed to
disclaim specifically as required by section 2-316 (2) of the Code.
This danger appears to have been recognized by the drafters of
the Code however, and would seem to be covered by subsections
(2) and (3) of section 2-719, which makes it clear that:
[A]ny clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner
is subject to deletion and in that event the remedies
made available by this Article are applicable as if the
stricken clause had never existed. Similiarly, under sub-
section (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or
operates to deprive either party of the substantial value
of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article.6
Additional protection from this danger is provided by section
1-102(3)7 of the Code, which provides that the provisions of
the Code may be varied by agreement, except that the obligations
of reasonableness and good faith may not be disclaimed by
agreement of the parties. The provision in section 1-106(1) that
remedies provided by the Code are to be "liberally administered
so that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as
if the other party had fully performed ... gives the buyer
still further protection.
This line of reasoning appears to have been followed in
Neville ChemicaZ Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.," where the buyer
brought action to recover consequential damages under an im-
plied warranty of merchantability. Here, the seller had limited
his liability to the refund of the purchase price and had further
required notification of breach within 15 days of delivery as a
condition precedent to recovery of damages. With reference to
the limitation of damages to the refund of the purchase price,
the court stated:
Like the fifteen day limitation, it is obviously designed
to cover a situation where the defect is discoverable
6. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, Comment 1.
7. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1967).
See Uniform Commerical Code § 1-102, Comment 2.
8. 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
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upon receipt of shipment and prompt discovery of de-
fects. The parties can be restored by prompt notifica-
tion to the seller, return of purchase price, and return
of material. But when the defect is not ordinarily dis-
coverable until the material has been processed,.., then
such a remedy is far below a bare minimum in quantum,
and is ineffective under the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-719 (2).
Such limitations on time and damages, when the de-
fect is latent, are illusory and under the circumstances
of this case represent no remedy at all 9
In Wison Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., o cited as
support for the holding of the Appellate Division in the present
case, the court noted that "parties to the contract are given
broad latitude within which to fashion their own remedies for
breach of contract,"" but it noted that the official comment to
section 2-719 of the Code12 makes it clear that, "it is the very
essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate
remedies be available for the breach .... , Continuing, the
court stated that:
Here the contract expressly creates an unlimited express
warranty of merchantability while in a separate clause
purports to indirectly modify the warranty without ex-
pressly mentioning the word merchantability. Under
these circumstances, the language creating the unlimited
express warranty must prevail over the time limitation
insofar as the latter modifies the warranty.14
From the foregoing, it is evident that the holding of the present
case, that "merchantability" must be specifically mentioned in
the limiting clause in order to limit in any way the implied war-
ranty of merchantability, is a direct outgrowth of Wilson. As
noted in the court's opinion, the decision in Wilson rests on sec-
tion 2-719 of the U.C.C., as does the decision in Neville. Both of
these cases involved latent defects, and both cases dealt with
an attempt to limit the buyer's remedy, as does the present case.
Thus the same practical effect which this case achieves by re-
9. Id. at 655; see Hawldaud, LIrITATION OF WARRANTY UNDER THE UNI-
roRm CoMMERcIAL CODE, 11 How. L.J. 28, 42 (1965).
10. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685 (1968).
11. Id. at 403, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 111, 244 N.E.2d at 687.
12. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, Comment 1.
13. 23 N.Y.2d at 403, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 111, 244 N.E.2d at 687.
14. Id. at 405, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 113, 244 N.E2d at 698.
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quiring the specific mention of merchantability in the limiting
clause, has been obtained on the basis of the ineffectiveness,
oppressiveness, or unreasonableness of the result. While "un-
conscionable" is nowhere defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code, these terms would seem to fit within the meaning of Dean
William D. Hawkland's statement that, "Terms are unconscion-
able only if they bring about surprise results or are oppressive."' 5
The holding of this case provides section 2-719 of the Code
with the potential for the somewhat mechanical operation pre-
viously available under section 2-316 of the Code with regard to
the "disclaimer" of the implied warranty of merchantability.
While the same results have been obtained previously under
section 2-719 on the basis of unconscionability or unreasonable-
ness where latent defects were involved, this holding would
appear to give some additional protection to the buyer. It could
prove to be especially effective in cases where the seller provides
an attractive warranty which he then limits in such a way as to
make it illusory. A logical extension of this incorporation of a
portion of section 2-316 into section 2-719 would be a require-
ment that in order for the limitation of damages to be effective,
it must be "conspicuous" within the meaning of section 2-316 (2)
of the code.
In light of this case, it is suggested that contract clauses
limiting the buyers remedy for breach should specify that the
limitation applies equally to any express or implied warranty
of merchantability. In South Carolina, any express or implied




15. Hawkland, Lintation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 11 How. L.J. 28, 34 (1965).
16. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2) (1962 version).
17. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.2-316(2) (Supp. 1966). This section differs from
the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2) (1962 version) in that the South
Carolina version of the Code contains the requirement that the implied war-
ranty of "fitness" as well as the implied warranty of merchantability must be
mentioned in specific language in order for the disclaimer to be effective. See
also Note, South Carolina Amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 21 S.C.L. Rxv. 400 (1969).
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